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8 Teaching for Social Justice 
in the Engaged Classroom 
The Intersection of Jesuit and Feminist 
Moral Philosophies 
KAREN L. SLATTERY, ANA C. GARNER, 
JOYCE M. WOLBURG, AND LYNN H. TURNER 
Jesuit and feminist educators, despite what ideological differ-
ences exist between them, embrace the moral necessity of teaching for 
social justice.1 Teaching for social justice involves creating a pedagogy 
focused on improving the lives of those disenfranchised by the larger 
culture.2 This common goal reflects similar core values and assump-
tions arrived at from two different ethical perspectives: Christian ethics 
and an ethic of care.3 While Jesuits and feminists share this common 
ground, they teach in a culture in which the moral concept of justice 
dominates. The concept of justice assumes independence, equality, and 
reason, while Christian ethics and an ethic of care assume interdepen-
dence, reason, emotion, care, and love. The tension that arises from 
these conflicting assumptions has underscored the care-justice debate 
in feminist literature and has enormous implications for the teaching 
of social justice in Jesuit institutions. Yet this debate and its implica-
tions have not been examined from a pedagogical perspective. 
Thus this chapter seeks to fill this void by weaving together the 
threads related to social justice, Christian ethics, and the ethic of care. 
In the process, we establish a framework within which to interrogate 
feminist and Jesuit pedagogical practices related to teaching for social 
justice. This framework allows us to determine how social justice-
related concepts, including emotion, power, and self-reflexivity, might 
more effectively be taught in university classrooms. 
Specifically, we do the following in this chapter: First, we offer a 
definition of social justice. Second, we explore the similarities in founda-
tional assumptions that animate both care-based and Christian moral the-
ories and contrast those with the assumptions that underpin justice-based 
moral theories. We draw on the commonalities between Christian-and 
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care-based assumptions to frame our critique of pedagogical practices 
germane to teaching for social justice and its related concepts. Third, we 
present and offer a critique of an example of teaching for social justice 
that took place in an undergraduate communication course offered by a 
university instructor who describes herself as a feminist. The critique 
allows us to explore how the intersections of Jesuit and feminist moral 
thinking inform teaching for social justice and, in turn, how practices of 
teaching for social justice inform the shared theories and concepts of 
feminism and Jesuit education. 
In our application, we pay particular attention to the concepts of 
emotion, power, and self-reflexivity. Emotion is important to consider 
because both Christian- and care-based moral perspectives, in direct 
contrast to Kantian and Rawlsian justice-based ethics, acknowledge that 
emotions playa critical role in moral reasoning. According to ethics of 
care philosopher Held, emotion provides "at least a partial basis for 
morality itself, and for moral understanding."4 Both Christianity and 
care are concerned with conditions of vulnerability and inequality, 
which give rise to issues of power,s Emotion grounds empathy, which 
in turn allows us to see and understand vulnerability and inequality, 
that is, those conditions that give rise to issues of power. 
Power is an important concept because feminist and Jesuit quests 
for social justice recognize that disenfranchised people possess much 
less power than other groups. Feminist and Christian traditions compel 
feminist teachers at Jesuit institutions to help students recognize and 
understand their social, economic, and political interrelationships to 
others and to motivate students to engage in action that addresses 
unequal relationships and other factors that systematically promote 
inequality within a cultur~. Instructors interested in teaching for social 
justice must find ways for students to recognize the relationship 
between intellect and emotion in moral decision making. 
Finally, self-reflexivity is formative and necessary for effective 
action. Empathy is needed to understand the emotional connection to 
vulnerability, which then leads to the recognition of power inequities 
and, when coupled with self-reflexivity, enables social action and 
change. This chapter examines specifically how we translate Christian 
ethics and an ethic of care into pedagogical practices. 
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Social Justice 
The term "social justice," scholars generally agree, is difficult to define 
precisely because definitions are relative to one's political, economic, 
and social perspectives; what some may perceive as just, others may 
perceive as unjust. 6 Rawls's work on distributive justice is viewed as a 
major contribution to contemporary Western thinking on the issue. He 
notes that justice is required when people with competing interests 
"press their rights on one another."7 He anchors justice to the individ· 
ual rather than to the overall well-being of the greatest number of mem-
bers of society, as utilitarian philosophers did, and advocates equality 
of basic liberties and rights to the resources necessary for survival. 
Rawls argues that primary social goods, including income and wealth, 
should be equally distributed unless an unequal distribution is to every-
one's advantage. Injustices arise when unequal distribution of primary 
social goods advantages some people and disadvantages others. Amid 
the vast literature responding to Rawls's conception of distributive jus-
tice, feminist scholars, in particular, have argued that the possession of 
material goods is not synonymous with well-being and have expanded 
the concept of primary goods to include the right to care.8 
Frey, Pearce, Pollock, Artz, and Murphy moved us closer to under-
standing how to teach for social justice when they urged a shift away 
from the focus on a precise definition of the concept and toward the 
development of a "social justice sensibility."9 They stipulated that social 
justice is the "engagement with and advocacy for those in our society 
who are economically, socially, politically and/or culturally under-
resourced."l0 A social justice sensibility, these scholars suggest, is "a 
sufficient guide for action" in most of the unjust circumstances that 
require people to reactY This sensibility is informed by four commit-
ments. To develop the sensibility, one must first be willing to fore-
ground ethical concerns when thinking about community. Second, one 
must commit to examining and resolVing structural problems that cause 
or perpetuate injustice. Third, one must adopt an activist orientation 
toward resolving the social injustice. Finally, one must move beyond 
oneself and be open to identifying with the other. Frey and his col-
leagues caution against confusing social justice with kindness, charity, 
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or hospitality. They also note that this sensibility is not impartial; emo-
tion plays a role in recognizing and acting on perceived social 
injustices. 
Embedded within this concept of social justice sensibility are themes 
common to both Christian ethics and an ethic of care, which, as noted, 
differ from justice-based ethics in significant ways. Before describing 
the tension between justice- and care-based ethics, we offer overviews 
of care- and Christian perspectives and point to the intersections 
between the two. Then we explore how feminists and Jesuits can work 
together to reduce this tension on a practical 1 evel. 12 
Christian and Care-Based Theories of Morality 
Christian ethics is the study of morality that draws on Judeo-Christian 
tradition to frame moral matters. Within this theoretical tradition, Hark-
ness identifies frames of reference within which the term "Christian 
ethics is used," which includes the ethical teachings of Jesus, the Bible, 
the New Testament, and the ethics of the Christian churchY 
These frames share a similar grounding in the concept of Christian 
love that is selfless and spiritual. The Roman Catholic religion describes 
Christian love as more than just affect. The Holy See describes it as 
"the service that the Church carries out in order to attend constantly 
to man's sufferings and his needs, including physical needs."14 Further-
more, these frames assume the interrelatedness of God and all human 
beings. Jesus underscored the value of relationships when he told the 
Pharisee that the greatest commandment is to "Love the Lord your God 
with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind." The 
second greatest commandment is to "Love your neighbor as yourself."15 
Situated within Christian ethics, and of particular interest here, is 
Catholic social teaching, a set of social and moral principles developed 
in the Catholic Church's writings since the late 1800s that address its 
positions on economic, political, and cultural issues. These principles 
relate to the individual and how they relate to one another. The dignity 
of personhood, rights and responsibilities to others, participation in and 
promotion of the common good, economic justice, stewardship of God's 
creation, peace, and global solidarity are assumed by these principles. 
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Governments, according to Catholic social teaching, playa role in pro· 
moting the principles. These writings are rooted in scripture, as well as 
the Catholic Church's philosophy and theology.16 
Jesuit pedagogy reflects the principles of Catholic social teaching. 
The Society of Jesus formally adopted the pursuit of social justice as 
part of its educational mission in 1975 at its Thirty-second General 
Congregation when it decreed that the Society's mission was "'the ser· 
vice of faith, of which the promotion of justice is an absolute require· 
ment.' "17 The mission has evolved since then to recognize that 
injustices are rooted in cultural attitudes and economic structures, and 
that social justice emerges when cultures transform through the" 'liber· 
ating power of the Gospel.' "18 
Christian ethics has been associated with the Christian church in its 
various forms. Likewise, the ethic of care, which has been associated 
with women's morality, is reflected in a range of perspectives. Here we 
will briefly address the contributions of three: the feminine, maternal, 
and feminist perspectives. The feminine perspective offers the ethic 
of care as a corrective for Western moral philosophers' disregard or 
trivialization of female characteristics or traits that inform moral think· 
ing. Gilligan points out that mainstream moral philosophers have privi· 
leged male voice, which speaks in terms of abstractions, justice, rights, 
and rules.19 She argues that women use a language stressing relation· 
ships, responsibilities, and contexts, identified by Tong as a language of 
care.20 
The maternal approach to the problem of morality relates to this 
feminine perspective. Maternalists advance a model based on relation· 
ships as they appear in the private sphere (e.g., between a mother and 
her child) to frame moral thinking. This model is a corrective for the 
contractual model at the heart of most traditional Western moral theo-
ries. The contractual model draws from relationships as they occur in 
the public sphere (traditionally dominated by males), where relation· 
ships are assumed to be independent, anonymous, and equal. However, 
maternalists point out that, as a practical matter, most relationships 
occur within specific contexts and between people of unequal power, 
knowledge, and access to resources.21 Humans, they argue, are contex· 
tualized and interdependent rather than independent in both private 
and public spheres.22 
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The feminist perspective, while sharing many values with the femi-
nine and the maternal, emphasizes the political. Care, from this per-
spective, as Tronto, among others, argues, is revisioned as a concept 
that, along with justice, should inform decision making in the public 
sphere. This reflects feminism's commitment to eliminating those insti-
tutions, structures, and attitudes that subordinate women and others 
who are oppressed.23 Feminist thinking, while inclusive of many differ-
ent perspectives, including Marxism, multiculturalism, globalism, and 
ecofeminism, aims to advance social justice. 
While feminine, maternal, and feminist perspectives differ in some 
ways, each has evolved in response to criticism of mainstream philoso-
phies that systematically ignore the relevance of women's ways of 
thinking and knowing. Together, they advocate an ethical system that 
acknowledges the experiences of all men and women, including the 
poor and the oppressed, and one that addresses the importance of inter-
dependence among human beings rather than independence. They 
argue against ideas that the most fully developed self is separated from, 
or independent of, others and that reality is most truthfully captured 
by knowledge that is rational, universal, and abstract.24 For the purpose 
of convenience, we will refer to these approaches as "care-based" in the 
rest of this chapter. 
This broad overview of care-based and Christian moral thinking sets 
the stage for us to examine the ways in which these two approaches to 
moral thought intersect. Understanding the intersections offers insight 
into how Jesuit and feminist instructors might work together to 
enhance teaching for social justice in higher education. 
Intersections 
Christian-based and care-based moral theories intersect on at least four 
important points: the concept of human interdependence, the empha-
sis on humans as relational beings, the acknowledgement of an inter-
play between emotion and reason in moral thinking, and the link 
between justice and care. 
The first important similarity between care-based and Christian 
moral theories is the assumption of human interdependence, although 
each grounds the claim differently. 
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Care-based theories are grounded in a pragmatic naturalism perspec· . 
tive and assume human interdependence as given. Accordingly, the 
human subject is understood as living in relationships with others in 
community to survive. Infants, for example, begin life dependent on 
others to meet their basic human needs. 25 As Tronto states, "All humans 
have needs that others must help them meet."26 The Christian tradition, 
in comparison, draws on spirituality, as opposed to material needs, to 
frame human interdependence. Yet similar to the care perspective, 
Christian spirituality assumes a caring God reflected in all of us as 
"persons in community who can enrich or impoverish the lives of those 
around us by our actions."27 
Deeply connected to this assumption of interdependence is the sec· 
ond important similarity-a shared emphasis on relations to others. 
Catholic social teaching underscores relations between oneself and oth· 
ers when calling on all people to "consider one's every neighbor with-
out exception as another self, taking into account first of all life and 
the means necessary to living it with dignity, so as not to imitate the 
rich man who had no concern for the poor man Lazarus."28 Care theo-
rists point out that our humanity is "mutual," and as humans, we are 
"already and potentially in relation."29 Therefore, care must be "the 
most basic moral value."30 
In addition to emphasizing interdependence and relationships, both 
Christian and care-based moral perspectives view the interplay between 
emotion and reason, rather than rationality alone, as necessary for the 
development of the complete person. Christianity emphasizes the inter· 
connectedness of reason and emotion, and the primacy of Christian 
love. Freedom and rationality are necessary if we are to decide what 
kinds of persons we wish to become.31 The Catholic Church posits that 
the will and intellect must be engaged if Christian love is to matureY 
Rationality is a necessary part of the process of caring for the other 
according to the ethic of care. Noddings argues that the "well-spring of 
human behavior is grounded in human affective response."33 Caring 
does not diminish rationality and may in fact, Noddings contends, 
enhance care through instrumental thinking. At the very least, she says, 
rationality ought to be engaged when one cares for the other. 
While emotion is viewed as a necessary component of morality, it is 
important to note that Christian- and care-based ethicists differ in their 
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views of the exact nature of emotion at the core of moral development. 
Christian theologians argue that the emotion is Christian love, that is, 
the love of God reflected in all human beings. Care theorists such as 
Noddings alternatively argue that the basic human affect is joy, an emo-
tion rooted in the concept of relatedness.34 We note that an exploration 
of the distinction regarding the exact nature of the emotion or emotions 
that underpin moral development is important; however, it is beyond 
this chapter's scope. 
Finally, the relationship between the concepts of care and justice 
commands the attention of Christian and feminist scholars. Theolo-
gians link justice to Christian love, arguing that the ideal of justice 
grows out of faith that is social and communaP5 Joseph Daoust, S.J., 
points out that the scripture loosely situates the idea of justice with 
"love, compassion, and the fullness of peace."36 In his encyclical letter 
Deus Cantas Est, Pope Benedict XVI writes that "love-caritas-will 
always prove necessary" even in the most just of states.37 He further 
describes the Church's duty to the ideal of justice, saying that while the 
state has the responsibility of structuring a just society, the Church 
has an obligation to "contribute to the purification of reason and to 
reawakening of those moral forces without which just structures are 
neither established nor prove effective in the long run."38 
At the same time, care theorists continue to examine the relation-
ship between justice and care. Some argue that care and justice are 
separate ethics, while others reason that care must logically precede 
justice, for without care there would be no reason for justice.39 Held 
argues that care, as the most basic moral value, offers the "the wider 
moral framework into which justice should be fitted."40 Feminist schol-
ars extend their analyses into many arenas of society, including culture, 
the professions, and politics.41 
Intersections between Christian ethics and the ethic of care inform 
our understanding of how to teach for social justice, a topic that we 
take up next. Before doing so, we must point out that these shared 
values and assumptions contrast starkly with those underpinning tradi-
tional Western moral philosophies, often categorized as justice-based 
moral theories. Justice-based theories, including Kant's duty ethics and 
utilitarianism, assume that humans are independent of one another, 
moral reason is only rational, and emotion rarely, if ever, should factor 
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into the moral equation. Relationships qua relationships, likewise, are 
not called into play when one is making moral decisions. Justice-based 
theories assume the impartial application of abstract moral principles 
to humans, who are, in theory, equal and autonomous. In contrast to 
this liberal paradigm of justice, however, we contend that the intersec· 
tions between Christian and care-based ethics, particularly as they 
relate to interdependence and emotion, offer a powerful perspective 
from which to think about teaching for social justice. 
The Practice of Teaching for Social Justice 
It is not sl,lrprising, given the shared assumptions between Christian-
and care-based moral theories outlined here, that Jesuit and feminist 
pedagogies also share important commonalities related to teaching for 
social justice. Both call attention to the roles of context, lived experi-
ence, the integration of emotion and reason, and action in the student-
centered learning process. Intersections between the moral and peda-
gogical perspectives of Jesuit and feminist educators, therefore, offer a 
common place from which to examine pedagogical practices related to 
teaching for social justice sensibilities in Jesuit higher education and 
elsewhere. Here we apply the framework developed in the previOUS 
section to one of our experiences of teaching for social justice in a 
communication course. 
We use as an example a class project in a multicultural/international 
advertiSing and public relations class offered at a Jesuit university. Stu-
dents majoring in advertising or public relations who completed basic 
introductory courses are eligible to take the course, and the multicul-
tural component typically includes a service-learning project, in which 
students gain real-world experience with a local client from an organi-
zation. The relationship between students and service-learning partners 
simulates that of an advertising/PR professional and client, with the 
students creating a product of value to the client. 
The course instructor and the director of a Native American ecO-
nomic development organization collaborated on a project with an 
assignment aimed at overcoming barriers to successful fund-raising. 
The organization set a goal of increasing its funding from grants and 
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contributions from individual sponsors and philanthropic organiza-
tions. The organization's leaders, however, recognized that many 
potential donors lack an understanding of their mission and harbor 
misperceptions of Native people, many of which are based on inaccu-
rate stereotypes. Failure to address these misperceptions and a lack of 
understanding would jeopardize the fund-raising efforts. 
The Native American project was designed to encourage learning on 
two levels. On an intellectual level, the assignment charged students 
with helping the organization and its Native American administrators 
with their promotional activities. Students could accomplish this by 
identifying misperceptions that could tarnish the organization's image 
in the community and by providing strategic solutions, given that repu-
tation management is a common need of organizations. On an emo-
tional level, the assignment challenged students to care. Presumably, 
this could occur if students gained a better understanding of Native 
American people, were touched by the oppression that this group expe-
riences, and felt a connection with Native American people. This blend-
ing of goals aimed to help each student develop as a "whole person, 
head and heart, intellect and feelings," which follows the Ignatian 
worldview.42 
To meet the Native American organization's goal of more effective 
fund-raising, each of the twenty students in the class read a first-person 
account by Native writers and then interviewed five non-Native Ameri-
can people about their perceptions of Native Americans. None of the 
one hundred interviewees identified themselves as Native Americans. 
Four of the students in the class were African American, three were 
Asian American, and one was Hispanic; the rest were Caucasian. Most 
students reported that prior to this assignment, they had had little to 
no contact with Native people, and that their understanding was 
informed by media images, stereotypes, and reports about conflicts over 
the Native American mascots of athletic teams. 
Recognizing Emotional Dimensions of Learning 
While classroom activities such as the Native American project provide 
intellectual stimulation and opportunities for rational thought, it is crit-
ical to acknowledge the role of emotion in the process and to recognize 
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its relationship to cognition. As Guerrero, Andersen, and Trost note, 
"clearly emotional experience and expression is part of a fabric of 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that blend together to characterize the 
tapestry of interpersonal interaction."43 The interaction in cfassrooms is 
no less grounded in the blend of emotion and reason. 
We as educators, however, must recognize that universities tradi· 
tionally value intellectual accomplishment more highly than emotional 
expression. When faculty members set goals that involve not only the 
head but also the heart, they often go beyond the stated learning out· 
comes that they are trained to assess-even in Jesuit universities and 
colleges. Thus, attempting to teach emotional intelligence in the class-
room is a complex and difficult endeavor that students, some instruc· 
tors, and the university may resist unless the campus culture explicitly 
supports it. 
While this assignment provided participants an unanticipated oppor· 
tunity to examine the relationship between emotion and cognition, the 
presence of intense emotion should have been expected. Rockquemore 
and Schaffer note that students progress through three stages of devel-
opment during this type of learning experience: shock, normalization, 
and engagement.44 These stages certainly bring emotion to the forefront 
in the classroom. In this case, the initial shock occurred when Native 
American people suddenly went from being invisible to visible. Despite 
the presence of a Native American-owned casino near .campus, stu-
dents vastly underestimated the number of Native people in the area. 
They were equally surprised at their lack of awareness of two Native 
American schools located within a two-mile radius of their campus and 
a Native American senior citizens' group that met at a church acrosS 
from the university dental school. One student commented that it is as 
though Native Americans and non-Native Americans live in parallel 
universes with no intersections. 
In this particular exercise, some classroom attempts to grapple with 
the emotion raised by the assignment brought about fruitful discus-
sions, and others did not. Students eventually got past the initial shock 
and normalized their understanding of Native American people, but 
not all students reached the engagement stage, going beyond identify-
ing social problems to developing a new understanding. Moments when 
students spontaneously raised questions usually generated more 
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insightful interactions than planned discussions, and critiques of nega-
tive perceptions were more powerful when delivered by students than 
by the professor. 
Dealing with issues that arouse intense emotion compels us to set 
aside time in the classroom for discussion. It is often difficult, however, 
to anticipate how open to discussion the students will be, how the 
relationship between the teacher and students will evolve, and how 
much insight will emerge. Discussions on sensitive topics are often 
beyond the comfort level of many faculty and students, who may 
remain silent out of fear of saying the wrong thing. Faculty members 
must recognize that an open atmosphere where students can speak 
without judgment is essential so that prejudicial attitudes can be criti-
cally evaluated. Professors also must recognize that they need to pre-
pare for surprises and be flexible, striking a balance between emotion 
and cognition. 
Feminists and Jesuits recognize emotion and intellect as involved in 
experience, which leads to action and, hopefully, social change. Under-
standing problems relating to emotion and reason is critical because 
"reason working in our emotional life forces us to take our feelings as 
an awareness of things outside us, as a consciousness of meaning and 
value of things other than ourselves."45 
Power Relations and Minority Audiences 
Challenges related to power dynamics are clearly tied to the emotional 
dimensions of learning in an engaged classroom. The issue of power 
emerges from the assumption of interdependence, a hallmark of both 
Catholic social teaching and the ethic of care. Relationships vary in 
levels of equality. It follows that developing a social justice sensibility 
requires one to explore issues associated with the imbalance of power. 
In this particular exercise, the issue of power emerged in unexpected 
places as students worked their way through the process. 
First, the assignment inadvertently viewed the students and faculty 
member as benevolent helpers, and the Native Americans from the 
local community as those in need of help. Service-learning classes in 
communication often partner with the clients of nonprofit organiza-
tions for class projects at the university. When partners are members 
15 2 K. L. SLATTERY, A. C. GARNER, J. M. WOLBURG, AND L. H. TURNER 
of minority groups, however, the potential for reinforcing feelings of 
superiority among the students and for perpetuating the unequal power 
relationships that accompany white privilege intensifies.46 Students and 
faculty members often believe that helping a group such as Native 
Americans leads to a positive outcome because it engages students and 
teachers in altruistic behavior. However, this model-which can, argua-
bly, be ego driven-risks reinforcing unequal power relationships, and 
encourages belief in a one-directional learning experience in which 
only the Native Americans, not the students and teachers, are helped 
and educated. 
Interrogating the dynamics of helping (especially as it differs from 
partnering) is one means of advancing the discussion on power rela· 
tionships. A class discussion that challenges students to think about 
who is actually being helped may actually create new ways of thinking. 
For instance, Jesuits argue that learning experiences such as the one 
examined here are two-way experiences. As members of the "middle· 
class tribe," most students live in a world where they are too distanced 
from the life-and-death struggle that is the daily fare of the pOOr.47 They 
see the poor as marginalized when, in fact, the marginalized are really 
at the center of things. As Dean Brackley, S.J., maintains, the middle 
and upper classes actually need the victims of oppression-the poor, 
abused women and children, racial and sexual minorities, and prison-
ers-more than the latter need the former, because they reveal both 
"the horror of evil in the world and the possibility for a more human 
way of living together."48 
Second, this assignment may have unintentionally reified unequal 
power relationships between students and their client. When students 
submitted their collected interview data, it was clear that some very 
negative perceptions existed among the one hundred members of the 
larger community who had been interviewed, none of whom reported 
themselves to he Native American. Two perceptions stood out: the 
belief that Native Americans have become wealthy from running casi-
nos and the contrasting view that Native American people are unem' 
ployed alcoholics living in poverty. Some participants interviewed were 
sympathetic in regard to the oppression that Native Americans experi· 
ence. Others, however, expressed resentment that Native AmericanS 
receive too many "handouts" from the U.S. government, are powerless 
TEACHING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE ENGAGED CLASSROOM 153 
to take control of their lives, and have taken political correctness to an 
extreme with their sensitivity to university mascots that derive from 
Native American traditions (e.g., the Warriors, Fighting Illini). 
Course readings and interviews, though intended to connect stu-
dents to a minority group in a positive way, may have had the negative 
effect of reinforcing harmful stereotypes or, worse, creating them 
where none previously existed. Judging from the commentary on their 
interviews, some students clearly bought into their interviewees' inac-
curate views, perhaps because the interviews offered a more accessible 
perspective and, therefore, one more real to students than the Native 
American first-person accounts they read for class. 
Students were required to present their interview findings to the 
client, a task that might have required greater sensitivity than the stu-
dents possessed. It was unclear how the findings themselves would be 
received-whether the harsh perceptions of the community would 
come as a surprise or whether they would confirm what the Native 
Americans already knew from experience. Clearly, the delivery of this 
information would require sensitivity. Otherwise, students might 
appear egotistical, arrogant, and prejudiced. 
These power issues must be addressed because both the Jesuit and 
feminist traditions call upon us as faculty, when teaching for social 
justice, to confront issues; thus passing up important teaching moments 
is not an option for the Jesuit feminist classroom.49 Jesuit universities 
and colleges are charged with providing students with significant intel-
lectual training and morally preparing them "to change the world when 
they leave the university."so To be morally prepared requires, according 
to Brackley, an understanding of the world's suffering, its causes, and 
possible solutions. It also means caring about others. 
Although an understanding of the world's suffering and its causes 
helps people to be morally prepared, faculty and students may need 
additional tools in order to confront power issues such as those dis-
cussed here openly. A class discussion about how students balanced 
interviewees' perspectives against their own as well as the first-person 
Native American accounts served as a first step in confronting power 
issues. However, the issues arose so unexpectedly that more work was 
needed to unpack all the nuances of the experience. In particular, dis-
cussions of how students felt changed as a result of the process were 
required. 
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One possible solution may lie in the concept of attentiveness, which 
requires the recognition of one's own need for care and the care-related 
needs of another. 51 An exploration of care of the self may put students 
in the position of having their own needs met by those who are receiv· 
ers of care, resulting in a two-way exchange. If the concept of attentive-
ness and self-care were applied as a starting point, it would place the 
care-giver and care-receiver in the same space at the same time. This 
could lead to a shift in the balance of power and require systematic 
attention to emotions and self-reflexivity. In this case, the instructor 
unwittingly approached the class exercise from Rawls's liberal distribu· 
tive justice paradigm, which focuses on rationality as opposed to emo· 
tion. Changing the beginning pedagogical stance to a care-based ethic, 
which includes attention to self-care, might have been a way of avoiding 
some of these difficulties. 
AddreSSing these issues can be particularly difficult for faculty with 
no training in teaching people to care. They can set an example of 
caring and offer students the opportunity to be touched by the people 
with whom they interact. Yet some students will predictably regard the 
aSSignment as merely an intellectual exercise. For them, the Native 
American assignment was no different from other exercises about man-
aging a client's reputation. Such assignments offer great opportunities 
for students to learn to engage with and care about the Other and 
ultimately learn to share power. There are no guarantees, however, that 
meaningful learning will occur. 
Self-Reflexivity in Engaged Learning 
Self-reflexivity, or evaluation, is an important part of the transforma-
tion process. This step leads to "a deeper understanding of how one's 
experience relates to the lives of others."52 This part of the process 
enhances the integrity and wholeness of a person and the person's con-
nections with others, which, in turn, can lead to social justice.53 
Self-reflexivity is a significant goal; however, as with the challenge 
of teaching students to care, exerting control over how, when, and to 
what extent it occurs is not easy. Teachin,g students to engage in self· 
reflexivity requires that faculty members give up some control in the 
classroom and engage in difficult discussions. However, it also depends 
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upon students' willingness to be introspective and honest with them-
selves. Confronting one's own prejudices and correcting stereotypical 
attitudes toward others can be painful. 
One class session during the Native American project spontaneously 
generated some discussion about the level of responsiveness on the 
client's part, which directly led to a degree of self-reflexivity among 
some class members. During this class period, a student expressed criti-
cism of the client's time commitment to the project and the amount of 
time he took to answer the students' questions. After a brief discussion, 
the faculty member defended the client by making note of the client's 
extensive involvement in meetings in the planning stages of the project, 
suggesting that the client's commitment to the project extended beyond 
what students were able to see. Though it was unintentional, this 
exchange probably sent the message to the class that the student's criti-
cism of the client was incorrect. More important, the student's com-
ment may have related to the larger and more complex issue of 
gratitude. When work is driven by altruism, the "helpers" usually 
expect some degree of gratitude from those who are "helped." The 
student's comment may have been an expression of frustration that 
the client had not shown proper gratitude. Going beyond the surface 
complaint and examining what was really happening could have led to 
a more fruitful discussion regarding students' expectations of gratitude, 
as well as a moment of reflection about different expectations for cli-
ents who are minority members. 
Because the exchange was unplanned and occurred on a day when 
other course material needed to be covered, the discussion was cut 
short. Students, as a result, lacked enough time to explore the criticism, 
and the instructor realized too late that she had lost a valuable teaching 
moment. Such discussions provoke anxiety because faculty members 
do not have the power to prevent students from making disparaging 
comments. The instructor's real concern at the time was that the criti-
cism of the client's action would be taken as one of the individual and, 
in turn, Native Americans in general. The reaction in such situations 
might be to try to maintain order and respect for the client, particularly 
if the client is the member of another race. However, the temptation 
to close the discussion and move on to a safer topic silences a voice 
that should be heard, precisely because it reflects a genuine although 
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uncomfortable position. When these thoughts are spoken out loud, the 
student's voice conveys a concrete idea with which the instructor can 
deal. Left unspoken, the idea remains but is inaccessible and therefore 
potentially more damaging. 
The responsibility to foster self-reflexivity in the engaged classroom 
rests on the instructor's shoulders, and first attempts at working 
through these pedagogical issues are predictably imperfect. Despite the 
lack of in-depth class discussions on issues such as the client's perceived 
commitment, some students engaged in self-reflection on their own, as 
evidenced by comments in their course evaluations. Furthermore, some 
students continued working with the organization through indepen-
dent studies the following semester, and one pursued a summer job 
with the organization. Those who embraced what the Native American 
people could teach them benefited from the two-directional learning 
process, and engaging in self-reflexivity further enabled their personal 
transformation. 
This class project and others like it, from the Jesuit perspective, 
encourage students to let the reality of others into their lives so that 
they can, in part, feel it and critically think about others in ways that 
help achieve social justice.54 Similarly, a feminist approach to pedagogy 
focuses on the whole person and strives to enhance students' connec-
tions with others. As Shrewsbury states, feminist pedagogy "requires 
continuous questioning and making assumptions explicit, but it does so 
in a dialogue aimed not at disproving another person's perspective, 
nor destroying the validity of another's perspective, but as a mutual 
exploration of explications of diverse experiences."55 
The demands of feminist and Jesuit perspectives can be difficult for 
faculty and students. Fear of rejection and retaliation for personal viewS 
about gender, race, ethnicity, social class, and sexual orientation can 
run quite high. These fears are especially apparent in classroom situa-
tions where the racial and gender composition of the students is mixed. 
At predominately white universities and colleges, where students of 
color are definite minorities in a classroom, these fears can promote 
student silence and faculty reluctance to confront difficult issues that 
need to be addressed. Issues of power, discrimination, representation, 
prejudice, and privilege come to the forefront and often challenge stu-
dents' sense of identity and position within their communities. These 
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issues likewise challenge a faculty member's own comfort level in deal-
ing with these sensitive matters in an empathetic and caring, yet peda-
gogically responsible, manner. 
Within feminist and Jesuit pedagogical approaches, discussion of the 
topics of race, gender, and class requires that courses function as semi-
nars that actively encourage discussion, reflection, and the exchange of 
views. Working with minority groups can be an especially effective way 
to encourage students to begin talking, sharing, and reflecting upon 
their position within the larger culture vis-a-vis those different from 
themselves. Illustrating that everyone has a stake in the outcome helps 
move discussions from personal stances to the larger issues in question. 
Conclusions 
Jesuit and feminist educators are charged with teaching for social jus-
tice in Jesuit institutions of higher learning. These institutions are situ-
ated in a larger culture in which justice-based theories of ethics that 
presuppose independence and equality dominate. These presupposi-
tions create tension for Jesuit and feminist teachers, since their philo-
sophical underpinnings assume human interdependence. This tension 
manifests itself in pedagogical practices. The common ground between 
Jesuit and feminist approaches offers a place to begin exploring ways to 
ameliorate such tensions and enhance teaching for social justice. 
Our exploration of these intersections of Christian- and care-based 
ethics offers a solid position from which we offered a critique of an 
example of teaching for social justice by a feminist in a Jesuit classroom. 
We discovered that, in the teaching process, issues of emotion, power, 
and self-reflexivity were inescapable. For instance, a project deSigned 
to make students aware of social stereotypes and power relations with 
Native Americans may have inadvertently reinforced stereotypes and 
reified inequitable power relations for some students. We also noted the 
difficulties of addressing emotion, particularly when Native Americans 
became visible to students for the first time. Finally, we identified the 
difficulties in helping students learn to be self-reflective. Sometimes 
self-reflection occurred without specific action, and other times it fal-
tered, despite the instructor's best intentions to foster the process. Fur-
thermore, although we examined emotion, power, and self-reflexivity 
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as discrete elements, we recognize their interconnectedness as they 
relate theoretically and practically to social justice. We suggested how 
theory can inform practice, so we now turn our attention to how prac· 
tice can inform theory. 
In the process of reflecting on this experience, it became apparent 
that faculty members can only go so far in solving problems related to 
emotion, power, and self-reflexivity in the classroom, given that each 
problem reflects issues too large for a single teacher to address. These 
issues must be engaged at the institutional level if helping students 
effectively develop social justice sensibilities is to become a reality. 
With this in mind, we propose institutional self-reflexivity and action 
in the following three areas: furthering the knowledge and understand· 
ing of emotion, the development of pedagogies appropriate to dissemi· 
nating that knowledge, and the understanding of how justice and care 
relate. 
First, we advocate scholarship and intellectual inquiry within the 
academy directed toward uncovering the knowledge of emotion. 
MaCMurray points out that moral behavior depends on the "absolute 
value of human beings as free human spirits," not as male or female, 
child or adult, black or white, or young or 01d.56 Part of the human 
spirit, he argues, has an emotional core, so being human requires a 
clear understanding of our intellectual and emotional selves.57 Intellec· 
tual or rational approaches to the problems of social justice are not 
enough. Relational thinking as it applies to our emotional beings must 
be developed in order to bring about social justice grounded in care 
and spiritual love. 
A true understanding of emotional knowledge should be on the uni· 
versity's research agenda, much the way that science has been for the 
last several centuries. Further, the subject of emotion should not be 
housed in women's studies departments or taught in an occasional phi· 
losophy course by a part-time instructor or in the psychology depart· 
ment, where it is treated as a variable that must be defined, categorized, 
isolated,' and tested. Emotional knowledge as it relates to our physical 
and spiritual beings ought to permeate the entire university curriculum, 
particularly since we are told that the "central core of our experience 
is seeking to accept one another and to be accepted for what we are, so 
that we may be ourselves and express ourselves for one another."58 That 
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process requires a genuine emotional understanding of the significance 
of subjects outside ourselves. Such understanding and knowledge lead 
to genuine communion with others, which in turn evolves into friend-
ship, cooperative living, society, and community. Within this sort of 
communion, social justice may flourish. 
Second, if emotion, as some argue, is central to moral thinking, 
then developing pedagogies that foster meaningful engagements with 
emotion within the learning environment becomes imperative. In the 
short term, instructors must continue to rely on intuition and a willing-
ness to take risks. The long term, however, requires a genuine commit-
ment to fostering social justice sensibilities based on a knowledge of 
how to teach intellectual and emotional skills and knowledge. 
Third, we insist on the pressing need to examine the relationship 
between justice and care. The theory of justice spelled out by Rawls, 
which accounts for much of our society's thinking about justice, does 
not account for care or emotion as do Christian- and care-based ethics. 
Rawls locates the starting point for justice within the individual on the 
assumption that individuals are autonomous and independent-not in 
relation to one another.59 Rawls's theory of justice does not account for 
Christian love or care and its relationship to human well-being. We 
have identified bodies of thought that link care and justice, but the 
work in this area is incomplete. Certainly, scholars from akin and 
Tronto to Kittay and Sevenhuijsen as well as Jacobson and Sawatsky 
and Daoust have explored the implications of the Christian- and care-
based ethics from philosophical a~d theoretical perspectives. This 
debate, however, is not fully developed. 
We encourage the academy to examine this argument further. We 
encourage Jesuit institutions of higher learning to put that problem 
before its faculty and students and ask for their best thinking. Theoreti-
cal and pedagogical questions such as "When might the individualism 
and rationality of the justice paradigm offer a counterbalance to the 
challenges of a caring paradigm?" and "How does justice inform caring 
practices in the classroom?" deserve to be asked and answered. We 
believe that the importance of the linkage between care and justice and 
its implications for understanding and teaching for social justice cannot 
be underestimated. 
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As a final note, we argue that Jesuit universities and colleges must 
continually engage in self-reflexivity about linking the theory of social 
justice with practice within their own institutions. If the institutions in 
which students are trained model injustice in any of their own behav-
iors, then one must ask whether it is reasonable to expect young men 
and women to move into the larger world and seek justice for all. Jesuit 
institutions must ensure that faculty genuinely understand Jesuit moral 
and teaching philosophies. Likewise, those who work within these insti· 
tutions of higher learning must be willing to hear the voices of others, 
including feminist instructors. For it is only with a shared understand-
ing of one another that we will realize our best efforts to provide oppor-
tunities for the transformation of students into men and women in 
service for others. 
